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1 Introduction
Fundamental theorems on welfare economics provide good reasons for mak-
ing rights to release greenhouse gases transferable. Quite simply, voluntary
exchange can harm no trading party. However, because the initial alloca-
tion of pollution rights isnt determined by nature or any benevolent planner,
the arguments are a bit more delicate. In particular, it complicates matters
that the amount and distribution of permits must be approved by indepen-
dent governments. Moreover, those bodiesdemands could depend on whether
trade is permitted. Presuming trade, this paper identies some incentives and
explores their implications.
Before embarking on analyses, we must take a stand regarding several
issues that a¤ect emission negotiations. Specically, we must model govern-
ments behaviors, constraints, decisions, and mode of interaction. We opt
to view these items as elements of a noncooperative setting. The reasons
are twofold. First, more than 15 years of intense negotiations have not lim-
ited emissions to levels that reect true cooperation. Accordingly, we nd
it inappropriate or premature and somewhat naive to preclude strategic,
noncooperative behavior. Second, concerning theory and its possible impacts,
we note that several authors, in particular Carbone et al. [6], have o¤ered
rather optimistic conclusions regarding the benets of cap & trade in a non-
cooperative setting. See also Copeland, Taylor [10] and Helm [18]. Therefore,
following their lead, we retain the name and nature of the game. That is,
governments rst decide the national quota. Second, permits are transferred
to domestic rms and traded internationally. A government may or may
not foresee the e¤ects of its choice. In any case, it enforces the rule that
emissions be backed by permits.1
Our set-up generalizes, and goes somewhat beyond, that of Helm [18] by
adding taxation of emissions generating activities as a governmental instru-
ment. This expansion of the strategic arsenal ts with what governments can
and actually do. Also, careful examination of equilibria in the Helm model
[18] points to good reasons for making taxation part of the game.2
1Because of the specic nature of our results, the latter assumption doesnt really bite.
2Here we briey explain why. Section 3 illustrates with an example. In a game without
taxes, as in Helm, there will always be at least one country in equilibrium, notably a
permit importer, which has a cost of reducing one more unit of emissions that is less than
its private gain from the better climate. Clearly, such a country would benet from lowering
emissions further than the level that results at this equilibrium point. The reason why such
reductions do not take place is because the only way it can be accomplished in that model
is by demanding a smaller initial quota in the agreement. However, this will increase the
permit price, and as the country is a permit buyer, its associated import bill will go up.
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The paper complements Copeland, Taylor [10] and Carbone et al. [6],
who, like Helm [18], limit the analysis to endogenous endowments followed by
trade. However, the two former studies include general equilibrium responses.
Like Helm [18], we retain a partial set-up and concentrate on the strategic
e¤ects. Our analysis also adds to Santore et al. [24] and Bréchet and Peralta
[5], who focus on taxes, taking endowments as given.
While Helm [18] reaches ambiguous conclusions as to the e¤ects of inter-
national cap & trade, Carbone et al. [6] o¤er more precise insights. Applying
Helms game in a computable general equilibrium environment, they nd that
trading is crucial. In fact, with trade, an equilibrium agreement can double
the emission reductions compared with the equilibrium without any trade,
and it can achieve more than half of the Pareto-optimal abatements.3
Our results suggest little reason for optimism. Emissions trading may
ourish but mainly yields income redistribution. Even with all countries on
board, overall pollution abatement could prove negligible. In short, the only
major e¤ects of permit exchange are that taxes on domestic emissions are
reduced and some income is redistributed.
Of course, it is not surprising that noncooperative behavior yields inef-
cient outcomes. But our results, spelled out below, challenge established
views. Section 3 illustrates various instances with an example. It also o¤ers
some intuitions. Section 4 leaves taxation aside and discusses some features
in closely connected literature. Section 5 comments on related studies, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model and the results
There is a xed and nite set I of jurisdictions, seen as countries. Each country
i 2 I has a benet i (ei) of releasing ei units of emissions and is adversely
a¤ected by climate change vi (e), e :=
P
i2I ei: There are two decision makers
in every country: a government and a representative agent, named a rm.
We begin with a situation where there is a global permit market in which
trade occurs at unit price p. The case without trading then becomes spe-
cial. Until further notice, decisions are made in accordance with the following
timetable.
Thus, such a country has an incentive to implement a positive tax on domestic emissions.
3They also provide, in a supplement, some results with current but exogenous taxes.
They report that their main results are insensitive to this extension. We will not compare
our results with those of Copeland and Taylor [10] until Section 4. Their more recent paper
[12], is less relevant to our study, as permits in that study are given exogenously.
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Date 1: Each and every government demands !i units of permits that it
nds acceptable in fact optimal for itself. These permits are then trans-
ferred to the domestic rm precisely how is left unspecied. At the same
time, the government levies a tax ti on domestic emissions.
Date 2: The rm chooses its emissions level ei, pays amount tiei to the gov-
ernment, and because compliance is assumed enforced, its choice of ei denes
its action in the global permit market.4
We put no restrictions on the sign of any variable of choice: negative emis-
sions mean that more carbon is captured from the atmosphere than is re-
leased. Plainly, this is an unlikely equilibrium outcome with current technolo-
gies. Negative allocation of permits entails committing to being more than
a carbon neutralsociety. That is, more permits must be bought than the
emissions that can occur. This may well happen for reasonable parameters in
some games. A negative tax is simply a subsidy and will not be precluded in
our analysis.
It is commonplace and convenient to assume that i (ei) and  vi (ei) are
strictly monotone, strictly concave, smooth, etc. Such assumptions are not
su¢ cient to guarantee equilibrium existence in several of the games to be dis-
cussed, including our own. The upshot is that they arent really necessary
either. In any case, equilibrium existence will not be addressed here.5
Standing assumption in this section (On equilibrium existence) In every
game considered, a Nash equilibrium exists.
We next dene equilibria with and without trade.
Denition 1
 (Tax-and-trade equilibrium) A collection (!i; ti; ei)i2I and a permit price p
4One could of course consider other timetables, in particular a three-stage game where
taxes are chosen second. While such a scenario seems perfectly reasonable, the analysis
becomes so complicated that we have nothing to o¤er. In particular, great di¢ culty would
result if we insisted on strategic behavior, subgame perfection and not sacricing the gen-
erality of i and vi.
5The main reason why equilibrium existence becomes a delicate issue is because we know
little more about the endogenous price curve p other than that it slopes downwards. Thus,
the same issues that arise in a standard Cournot game also arise here. In addition, to
complicate matters further we have players on both sides of the market. Nevertheless, in a
quadraticlinear environment as in Section 3, equilibrium existence appears to be granted.
5
is declared a tax-and-trade equilibrium i¤ (!i; ti)
maximizes fi(ei)  vi (e) + p  (!i   ei)g (1)
for each government i 2 I. Moreover, ei
maximizesfi (ei)  tiei + p  (!i   ei)g (2)
for each rm i 2 I, and p clears the emissions market:X
i2I
ei =
X
i2I
!i: (3)
When aiming for (1), the government takes the choices of other governments
as given. How they behave is detailed below. Each and every rm treats !i; ti
and p parametrically.
 (No-trade equilibrium) A prole (ti; ei)i2I is a no-trade equilibrium i¤ it is a
tax-and-trade equilibrium with decision variable !i removed from (1) together
with market revenues in (1) and (2), as well as dispensing with the clearing
condition (3).
Note that by (1) a government has no particular interest in tax revenues
or expenses it merely cares for the domestic product.
The no-trade equilibrium yields the classical 0i(ei) = v
0
i (e) for all i 2 I,
which will be referred to as the no-trade condition. In our partial frame-
work, such an equilibrium may come about as a result of policies other than
taxes, for instance via a family of closed domestic permit markets. We next
relate our game to some established ones in the literature.
Denition 2
 (No-tax equilibrium) A collection (!i; ei)i2I and a permit price p is a no-tax
equilibrium i¤ it is a tax-and-trade equilibrium for xed ti = 0 for all i 2 I.
 (Exogenous-endowment equilibrium) A prole (ti; ei)i2I and a permit price
p is an exogenous-endowment equilibrium i¤ it is a tax-and-trade equilibrium
for exogenous (!i)i2I .
 (Pareto optimum) Emissions (ei)i2I are Pareto optimal i¤0i(ei) =
P
j2I v
0
j (e)
for all i 2 I:
The no-tax equilibrium is none other than Helms [18] and in terms of gov-
ernmentsstrategy sets also that of Carbone et al. [6] and Copeland and
Taylor [10]. Helm [18] also has a no-trade equilibrium that is essentially the
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same as ours. The exogenous-endowment equilibrium is fairly close to that of
Santore et al. [24, Section 3.2] and Bréchet and Peralta [5]. The Pareto opti-
mality condition is because of Samuelson [23] and is included for the record.
When it comes to the behavior of governments, we examine two scenarios:
Denition 3 (On behavioral mode) A government is said to be strategic
if it fully accounts for the e¤ects on p of its own !i and ti, i.e., the terms-of-
trade e¤ects. It is said to be price taking if it consistently treats p as an
exogenous parameter.
Our main result follows.
Theorem (On emissions) Suppose all governments are strategic and that
(ei)i2I is an emissions prole in a tax-and-trade equilibrium. This prole
thus satises the no-trade condition: 0i(ei) = v
0
i (e) for all i 2 I.
The proof of this result, together with those for most of the others, is in
the appendix. Before comparing this result to those in the literature, an im-
plication merits mention.
Corollary (On welfare) Suppose all governments are strategic and that an
equilibrium emissions prole is unique, both with trade and without. Then the
benets and costs of emissions in every country are una¤ected by the presence
of trade.
Its most natural to compare our main result with those in Helm [18]. He
nds that the e¤ects of cap & trade on aggregate emissions are data depen-
dent. Moreover, the welfare e¤ects can go either way. Our result only depends
on the existence of equilibrium. Furthermore, because of the nature of our re-
sult, the global welfare implications of having an international permit market
are unambiguous. There are none.
One may perhaps wonder whether there would be any trade in our tax-
and-trade equilibrium. Indeed, when countries di¤er in i and vi, the outcome
typically involves trade (see also Section 3). Such trade will of course promote
e¢ ciency for the given endowments, but not compared with the policies that
would arise without trade.
We next inquire how robust our main result is against some governments
being price takers, believing that @p
@!i
= @p
@ti
= 0; see Denition 3.
Proposition 1 (On the e¤ects of market power) Suppose at least one gov-
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ernment acts as price taker and that (ei)i2I is an emissions prole in an
equilibrium with tax and trade. Such a prole satises the no-trade condition:
0i(ei) = v
0
i (e) for all i 2 I.
This result shows that the rst assumption in our theorem may be relaxed,
and it implies that there are no real e¤ects of market power other than a
possible redistribution of income. However, the tax levels may be a¤ected
by behavioral mode, as the permit price, in the presence of price takers, be-
comes nil (see the proof). Nevertheless, the price for emissions faced by rms
remains una¤ected. At rst sight, this result appears identical to Copeland
and Taylors [10, Proposition 8] although they are in a general equilibrium
environment without taxes. As it turns out, this isnt quite so; see Section 4.
Now, following Carbone et al. [6] and Helm [18] we ask: Which countries,
if any, would nd it interesting to participate in a trading regime? To address
that question, we add a stage to the game at Date 0. Here, each government
makes a noncooperative regime choice ri 2 fg; lg of qualitative nature. If the
government chooses ri = g for global, then it decides to participate in an
international trading regime and belongs to set G. On the other hand, if it
chooses ri = l for local, it stands alone and belongs to set L. Thus, I is the
disjoint union of G and L. Temporarily replace I with G in the market clear-
ing condition (3), and write i (ri; r i) for the value function associated with
a government objective when ri 2 fg; lg . Here, and elsewhere,  i := Ifig.
Denition 4 (An equilibrium agreement) A collection (ri )i2I is declared a
Nash equilibrium agreement i¤
i
 
ri ; r

 i
  i  ri; r i (4)
for all ri 2 fg; lg and all i 2 I.
Proposition 2 (On an equilibrium agreement) For every given (ri)i2I suppose
there exists a unique equilibrium in the game occurring at Date 1. Then, if
some (ri)i2I is an equilibrium agreement, then the associated emissions prole
(ei)i2I satises the no-trade condition: 
0
i(ei) = v
0
i (e) for all i 2 I.
Whether a government gains or loses by belonging to any list G depends
merely on whether it ends up as a permit seller or buyer. If indeed there is
trade among those listed in G, at least one agent must be a buyer, having
p  (!i   ei) < 0. If this country was listed in L, it would get exactly the
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same emissions benets and climate impacts, but market expenses would dis-
appear. Hence, an equilibrium list G cannot contain any permit buyers and
is therefore not compatible with an active market. Finally, opening up for
multiple regional permit markets clutters notation considerably, with no gain
in insight of which we are aware.
The rest of the paper returns to the timetable starting atDate 1, and assumes
that all governments take part in international permit exchange. Two minor
results remain in this section. With one exception, notably (9), economic intu-
ition and established literature are merely conrmed, mostly without mention.
The results follow from the proof of our theorem and may be skipped or post-
poned.
Lemma 1 (Characterization of buyers and sellers) Suppose all governments
are strategic. Then, in an equilibrium with trade, the following are equivalent:
country i
 is a permit exporter, ei < !i,
 has a lower marginal abatement cost than permit price, 0i (ei) < p,
 and subsidizes domestic emissions, ti < 0.
The same results apply to a permit buyer if the inequalities are reversed
and the wording changed accordingly. Applying our main result, the second
bullet point states that a permit exporter has marginal climate damage that
is below the permit price, similar to Helm [18]. The equivalency between the
rst and last bullet points is similar to that in Santore et al. [24].
In preparation for what comes next, write
si :=
1
00i (ei)
and S :=
X
i2I
si (5)
evaluated at equilibrium ei.
Lemma 2 (Characterization of behavioral mode) For given (!i; ti)i2I , sup-
pose there is a unique (ei)i2I and clearing price p, and that i (ei) is strictly
concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable in the neighborhood of optimal
ei. Then, and with apologies for abusing notations, a strategic government i
behaves consistently with setting
@p
@!i
=
1
S
< 0 and
@p
@ti
=  si
S
2 ( 1; 0) ; (6)
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@ei
@!i
= si
@p
@!i
2 (0; 1) and @ei
@ti
= si

@p
@ti
+ 1

< 0; (7)
X
j2I
@ej
@!i
= S
@p
@!i
= 1 and
X
j2I
@ej
@ti
= si + S
@p
@ti
= 0: (8)
Moreover, a price-taking government i behaves in accordance with the knowl-
edge that
@ei
@!i
= 0,
@ei
@ti
= si,
X
j2I
@ej
@!i
= 0 and
X
j2I
@ej
@ti
= si. (9)
(6)(8) and the rst two equalities in (9) are standard and in line with eco-
nomic intuition. What appears to contrast with the ndings of Copeland and
Taylor [10] is the right hand side of the third equality in (9). That is, a price-
taking government does not understand that demanding another permit from
a treaty will have an e¤ect on global emissions. To see why this is so, it is
most expedient to look at the origin of the rst result in (8).
A rm j 2 I chooses emissions ej = (0j) 1 (p+ tj). Di¤erentiating aggre-
gate emissions with respect to !i, one gets
P
j2I
@ej
@!i
=
P
j2I
1
00j (ei)
@p
@!i
. Anyone
consistently seeing p as a parameter must believe that the last sum vanishes.
In economic terms, emissions adapt in fact because rms around the globe
will face lower prices and therefore adjust. But when the price e¤ect is not
understood by the government, the right hand side of the third equality in
(9) is the result. Finally, the last part of (9) suggests that a price-taking
government behaves consistently by believing that global emissions fall if its
domestic tax is raised. Those readers interested in some generalizations may
consult [13].
Remark (On second stage uniqueness) When it comes to the key hypoth-
esis on uniqueness in Lemma 2, one may ask: How strong is it? Recall that
we are in a quasilinear and externality-free environment at the second stage
of the game. Therefore, the xed point problem of nding a prole (ei)i2I and
clearing price p is reduced to the single optimization problem
max
(ei)i2I
(X
i2I
fi (ei)  tieig :
X
i2I
ei =
X
i2I
!i
)
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with p being the familiar Lagrange multiplier; see, for example, Shapley and
Shubik [25, Footnote 3] or Qin et al. [27] for more recent material. Hence,
a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for uniqueness is that all i (ei) are
strictly concave and at least one of them is continuously di¤erentiable. Clearly,
if we do not have uniqueness at the second stage, then our rst stage game
isnt even well dened. Nevertheless, these issues will not be addressed further
here (see also Section 5).
3 An example
This section o¤ers an example for the sole purpose of illustration. There
are two countries with strategic governments. Emissions benets i (ei) are
quadratic, climate costs vi (e) are linear, and the parameters have been se-
lected to facilitate exposition.
Table 1. The example.
Country Benets, i(ei) @Benets, 0i(ei) Damages, vi (e)
1 4e1   12 (e1)2 4  1e1 1 (e1 + e2)
2 8e2   32 (e2)2 8  3e2 3 (e1 + e2)
For interpretation, country 1 may be seen as a high-emissions country, hav-
ing four units of business-as-usual emissions, not greatly a¤ected by climate
change and with a marginal cost of reducing emissions that grows fairly
slowly. Conversely, country 2 has lower business-as-usual emissions but is
more severely a¤ected by climate change and has a marginal cost of reducing
emissions that grows more rapidly.
Pareto optimum Here, each government sets a tax that reects the so-
cial cost, yielding 0i (ei) = v
0
1 (e) + v
0
2 (e) for both i = 1; 2. The results are as
follows.
Table 2. Pareto optimum.
11
Country ti ei 0i (ei) i (ei)  vi (e) Total payo¤
1 4 0 4 0  11
3
 11
3
2 4 11
3
4 8  4 4
Total 11
3
8  51
3
22
3
As is well known, this situation isnt robust against individual deviations.
Therefore, we continue with the classical noncooperative outcome.
No-trade equilibrium In our version of the game, each government sets
a tax that maximizes domestic welfare implying 0i (ei) = ti = v
0
i (e) for each
i = 1; 2. Alternatively, it caps national emissions via a domestic permit mar-
ket.
Table 3. No-trade equilibrium.
Country ti ei 0i (ei) i (ei)  vi (e) Total payo¤
1 1 3 1 71
2
 42
3
25
6
2 3 12
3
3 91
6
 14  45
6
Total 42
3
162
3
 182
3
 2
Alternatively, with separate domestic permit markets instead of taxes, one
gets !1 = 3 and !2 = 123 . As usual, it follows that the aggregate emissions
are ine¢ ciently allocated, because they produce benets at di¤erent margins.
This motivates bringing in a permit market as in Helm [18].
No-tax equilibrium Here taxes are exogenously xed to zero and each
government decides noncooperatively on an initial quota !i, understanding
that there will be subsequent exchange. Together with market clearing, the
rst-order optimality conditions are given by
0i(ei) +
@p
@!i
(!i   ei)  v0i (e) = 0 and 0i(ei) = p, (10)
with @p
@!i
=  3
4
for our specic parameters. The outcome follows next.
Table 4. No-tax equilibrium, Helm [18]. The permit price equals 2.
12
Country !i ei 0i (ei) i (ei) p (!i   ei)  vi (e) Total payo¤
1 31
3
2 2 6 22
3
 4 42
3
2 2
3
2 2 10  22
3
 12  42
3
Total 4 4 16 0  16 0
Compared with the no-trade case, the low-damage country 1 increases its
endowment; country 2 reduces it. Emissions are allocated e¢ ciently. More-
over, that total falls and climate damage is less, leaving total welfare change
positive. But, as pointed out by Helm [18], these results are parameter sensi-
tive, and for others, total emissions as well as welfare may show the opposite
tendency. Moreover, in accordance with Helm [18, Proposition 1] the country
less a¤ected by climate change becomes the permit exporter.
Note that in the no-tax equilibrium, the permit importing country 2 has
marginal damage that is greater than its own cost of reducing a ton of emis-
sions. From (10), we see that this is a general feature. Hence, ceteris paribus,
country 2 would benet from lowering its emissions further. However, in the
absence of an emissions tax, the only way this can be accomplished is by cut-
ting its quota. That raises the import bill. This is why it doesnt pay o¤ at
an equilibrium point.
Tax-and-trade equilibrium Finally, each government decides on both a
quota and a tax. Then rms exchange permits in a common marketplace and
pay a tax on their own emissions to their respective governments.
Table 5. Tax-and-trade equilibrium. The permit price equals 21
2
.
Country !i ti ei 0i (ei) i (ei) p (!i   ei)  vi (e) Total payo¤
1 31
2
 11
2
3 1 71
2
11
4
 42
3
4 1
12
2 11
6
1
2
12
3
3 91
6
 11
4
 14  6 1
12
Total 42
3
42
3
162
3
0  182
3
 2
As in Helm [18], the low-damage country 1 will export permits. Also, its
initial quota is adjusted upward compared with the no-trade equilibrium. Fi-
nally, emissions there become subsidized. The converse is true for country 2.
Most importantly is that the variables of prime economic interests emissions,
benets and costs remain unchanged compared with the no trade case (Table
3).
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If at least one of the governments were modeled as a price taker when
choosing ti and !i, then the outcome would also return to the no-trade case
given in Table 3 with !1 + !2 = 423 and illustrating Proposition 1. Lastly,
returning to strategic governments, and illuminating Proposition 2, according
to Table 5 the permit importing country 2 is worse o¤ compared with the
no-trade equilibrium. Hence, if we include a decision at Date 0 dealing
with participation in international trade, then country 2 would chose not
to participate a decision that once again brings us back to the no-trade
equilibrium.
4 Some remarks on the related literature
This section returns to the case without taxes. Some properties emerge that
we nd a bit discomforting in the most closely related literature, notably Helm
[18], Carbone et al. [6] and Copeland and Taylor [10]. The problems addressed
arise if not all governments are strategists.
4.1 Partial equilibrium
Helm [18] presumes that all governments are strategic. In practical terms,
this means that all countries involved and irrespective of their size and other
characteristics fully account for the e¤ects on the international permit price
by choice of quota. We next inquire how price-taking behavior a¤ects equi-
librium.
Proposition 3 (On price-taking behavior without taxes) Consider a no-tax
game as given in the rst item of Denition 2 and taken from Helm [18].
Suppose, as in Helms study, that 0i (ei) > 0 for all i 2 I, and that at least
one government is a price taker. Then, no equilibrium exists.
The proof of this result ts best here. Together with market clearing, the
rst-order necessary optimality conditions in a no-tax equilibrium at the rst
and second stages, respectively, read
0i(ei)
@ei
@!i
+
@p
@!i
(!i   ei) + p

1  @ei
@!i

  v0i (e)
X
j2I
@ej
@!i
= 0 (11)
and
0i(ei) = p: (12)
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Because the rst and third equality in (9) are not a¤ected by the presence of
taxes, they can be directly plugged into (11) to get p = 0. By assumption,
0i (ei) > 0, which contradicts (12). 
It may well be that equilibrium existence can be reestablished if the assump-
tion 0i (ei) > 0 is replaced with the weaker 
0
i (ei)  0. Indeed, such a modi-
cation is quite reasonable as a permit is a right to pollute, not an obligation.
Having more than enough will add nothing to prots. But if ei is so large
that 0i (ei) = 0, then 
00
i (ei) naturally vanishes as well. If strategic agents are
also present, the key assumption in Lemma 2 may no longer hold, so that the
inverse function theorem does not immediately apply. Where this will lead,
we do not know.
The above result has made use of
P
j2I
@ej
@!i
= 0 for a price taker; refer to
(9). If one instead follows Copeland and Taylor [10] in setting
P
j2I
@ej
@!i
= 1
for a price taker, then we get from (11) that v0i (e) = p, which by (12) also
must = 0i (ei) for every nonstrategist. Now suppose that vi is a¢ ne but
not the same for all governments that ignore their market power. Then, few
reasonable results seem to appear.
4.2 General equilibrium
In contrast to Helm [18], Carbone et al. [6] do not assume that all governments
are strategic. Their general equilibrium computations exclude all but ve
strategic players from the negotiations and subsequent trade. They argue that
many of the countries in this excluded rest of the worldare unlikely to pursue
strategic climate change policies. However, as we are in a pure public good
situation, we may become worried about getting rid of most participants from
the outset, as well as aggregating many countries into regions before playing
the game.6 Nevertheless, if we insist that governments of smallcountries are
nonstrategic, then it could be posited that they take prices as given. If this
is done in Carbone et al. [6, p. 272, system (11)] we get the same qualitative
result as for Helm [18] discussed above.
Although Helm [18] and Carbone et al. [6] do not consider price-taking
governments, Copeland and Taylor [10] do. They report in Section IV C, page
727, that with such governments
... allowing trade in pollution permits has no e¤ect on production, incomes,
6Their ve strategic players are: USA, Japan, China, western Europe and the former
Soviet Union. Only the rst three are sovereign states.
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pollution, or welfare. [...] Despite the fact that pollution permits are potential
revenue-generators for governments, opening up international trade in pollution
permits does not create an incentive to increase their supply beyond the levels of
the pure goods-trading equilibrium. This is because pollution is a pure public bad.
The formal analysis on this issue appears in their Section VII, where gov-
ernments understand the terms-of-trade e¤ects. The rst-order condition for
a government taking care of its market power when choosing its permit endow-
ment is given by di¤erentiating the indirect utility function in their display
(25) to get
1
Li + Ei

+ Ei
@
@Ei

  1

@
@Ei
   (Ew) 1
X
j2I
@Ej
@Ei
= 0: (13)
What matters here, in terms of notation, is that  is the permit price, Ei
the chosen permit allocation by government i, Ew the global emissions, and
 (Ew) 1 the marginal impact of climate change in the country under con-
sideration,  and  being parameters, the same for all. If replacing
P
j2I
@Ej
@Ei
in (13) with 1, just as in (8), we then indeed obtain their stated condition (on
page 731) that
   (Ew) 1 Ii   i  

Ew
Ii = 0; (14)
where the last term captures the terms-of-trade e¤ects. As they point out,
that e¤ect vanishes if governments are price takers. It also vanishes when
aggregating (14) across all countries when governments are strategic, and
the conclusion is reached on page 732 that the level of world pollution is
una¤ected by the recognition of terms of trade e¤ects!. If we now adopt the
logical consequence of being a price taker in not understanding that emissions
by all rms adapt to lower prices, see Lemma 2 (with comments), then it seems
that this will correspond to setting both
P
j2I
@Ej
@Ei
and @
@Ei
= 0 throughout
(13). If we do this, the abovementioned condition reduces to  = 0, just as
in Helm [18] and Carbone et al. [6]. Conversely, if price-taking governments
treat
P
j2I
@Ej
@Ei
= 1, then  =  (Ew) 1 Ii is obtained for each and every
price-taking government i. This can only be possible if all countries have the
same income Ii = Li + Ei, which appears to be the case in Copeland and
Taylors two-type country world.
To sum up, we are not sure which message we should take home from
Copeland and Taylors [10] analysis, regardless of the denition of price-taking
behavior.
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5 On other related literature
The strand of literature this paper belongs to Helm [18], Carbone et al. [6]
and Copeland and Taylor [10] has an international permit market at center
stage and brushes away many of the issues that are at the core of other material
on international environmental agreements, whether in some form of coalition
or partition. See, for example, Barrett [3], Chander and Tulkins [8], Finus
[14] and Hoel [19] for early material; see Asheim et al. [1], Chander [7] and
Germain et al. [17] for more recent.
In terms of the tax instrument, our analysis is most closely related to
Santore et al. [24] and Bréchet and Peralta [5], which both work in a partial
equilibrium framework. Some papers study both taxes and quotas, although
separately, such as Ishikawa and Kiyono [20], but they have no environmental
externality. In terms of transboundary pollution and taxes within a general
equilibrium environment; see Copeland and Taylor [9], [11].
In the broader perspective, but without environmental externalities, our
paper draws on two strands of literature. One well known deals with tari¤s
and international trade. The other, also well-established but seemingly lesser
known, concerns pure exchange economies manipulated via endowments. Of
particular relevance to our paper are Aumann and Peleg [2], Gabszewicz [15]
and Postlewaite [21]. In that family of studies, however, everyone has an
endowment given by nature. But when it can be manipulated on the market,
the analytical apparatus shares many traits with ours.
The reader may recall that we have not dealt with the fundamental issue of
equilibrium existence. This is a delicate matter, although quasilinear utilities,
separable climate impacts and other convenient assumptions we have made
are likely to help. When it comes to the presumably easier case of pure,
externality-free, exchange economies manipulated via endowments, there are
few results available. One is Safra [22], but he considers large economies. Bon-
nisseau and Florig [4] is another, but they limit attention to linear exchange
economies. Peck et al. [26] is a third, but they consider Shapley and Shubiks
strategic market game [25], which is very di¤erently formulated from ours.
Existence of equilibrium in tari¤ games is addressed in Wong [28]. It appears
though that if one is willing to broaden the notion of equilibrium beyond
standard Nash, see for example [4] and references therein, then equilibrium
existence may become easier to guarantee.
17
6 Concluding remarks
We hesitate in drawing policy implications from our exercise. What is notable
is that our results in contrast to those in Helm [18] are sharp, and theyre
markedly di¤erent from the specic and rather optimistic ones in Carbone et
al. [6]. In any case, it seems worth emphasizing that all the good properties
of cap & trade programs when applied to environmental problems conned to
a single jurisdiction do not immediately carry over to an international setting,
in neither theory nor practice thus far.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2 The rst-order necessary optimality conditions at the
second stage of the game are
0i (ei) = p+ ti for each rm i 2 I and
X
i2I
ei =
X
i2I
!i: (A.1)
Under the assumed conditions, there exists, locally, a di¤erentiable function
fi := (
0
i)
 1 for each i 2 I such that
ei = fi (p+ ti) (A.2)
with f 0i =
1
00i
. From (A.2), it then follows that
@ei
@!i
=
1
00i (ei)
@p
@!i
and
@ei
@ti
=
1
00i (ei)

@p
@ti
+ 1

. (A.3)
Market clearing requires X
j2I
fj (p+ tj) =
X
j2I
!j: (A.4)
Di¤erentiating the last equality throughout with respect to !i yields
@p
@!i
=
1P
j2I
1
00j (ej)
and
@p
@ti
=  
1
00i (ei)P
j2I
1
00j (ej)
; (A.5)
which takes care of (6). Apply (A.5) in (A.3) to get (7). Statement (8) fol-
lows by di¤erentiating the left hand side of (A.4) with respect to !i and ti,
respectively. Finally, we obtain (9) by setting @p
@!i
and @p
@ti
= 0 in (7) and (8),
respectively. 
Proof of Lemma 1 By the necessary rst-order optimality conditions at
the rst stage of the game, a prole (!i; ti)i2I satises
0i(ei)
@ei
@!i
+
@p
@!i
(!i   ei) + p

1  @ei
@!i

  v0i (e)
X
j2I
@ej
@!i
= 0 (A.6)
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and
0i(ei)
@ei
@ti
+
@p
@ti
(!i   ei) + p

0  @ei
@ti

  v0i (e)
X
j2I
@ej
@ti
= 0 (A.7)
for each government i 2 I. Combining this with Lemma 2 and denition (5),
it then follows that (A.6) and (A.7) reduce to
(0i(ei)  p)
si
S
+ p+
1
S
(!i   ei)  v0i (e) = 0 (A.8)
and
(0i(ei)  p)

1  si
S

  1
S
(!i   ei) = 0; (A.9)
respectively. As S < 0 and
 
1  si
S
 2 (0; 1), it follows from (A.9) that a
permit seller must have 0i(ei) < p, which takes care of the rst equivalency.
Combine that with 0i (ei)  p = ti from (A.1) to get the last. 
Proof of Theorem Add the left hand sides of (A.8) and (A.9). 
Proof of Proposition 1 The rst-order necessary optimality conditions for
strategic agents, if any, given in (A.6) and (A.7) are not a¤ected by the pres-
ence of other agents acting as price takers. For anyone of the latter type, plug
(9) into (A.6) and (A.7). The last two conditions then reduce to
p = 0 and 0i(ei)  p  v0i (e) = 0; (A.10)
respectively, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2 A country i 2 L gets a payo¤ i (l; ) that sat-
ises 0i(ei) = v
0
i (e) = ti. Next, replace I with G in (3), (5), (8), (A.1), (A.4)
and (A.5), but importantly not in the denition of e :=
P
i2I ei, appearing
in (A.6) and (A.7). One then gets, by the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 1, that 0i(ei) = v
0
i (e) = p+ ti, for all i 2 G. 
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